financial innovations have perceptibly altered the velocity of various monetary aggregates, with special emphasis on the experience over 1981 as a whole. The second section reviews recent quarterly data on relations among money demand, short-term interest rates, real income, and prices and attempts to sort out the sources both of the continuance of high short-term interest rates and of recent intrayearly swings in money demand. A final section of the paper reflects on the meaning of erratic short-run money growth and its implications for how precisely to control monetary aggregates and for the usefulness of intermediate monetary targets.
Financial Innovations and Velocity Behavior
Contrasting views have recently been advanced on the impact of financial innovations on the relations between the monetary aggregates and broader economic conditions. Some commentators argue that the current wave of innovations is significantly affecting these relations and in the long run may even threaten the viability of intermediate moneystock targets.' Others take an opposing position, contending that MI velocity, at least, has not departed much in recent years from historical patterns.2 In an effort to bring empirical evidence to bear on these issues, this section analyzes recent growth rates of the velocity of monetary aggregates in the context of longer-term trends. This point only initiates a complete analysis of the effects of financial innovations on MI velocity behavior. The expansion of ATS and NOW accounts, which are presently included in Ml, has been boosted by shifts from savings deposits and other non-Mi sources, thereby raising the growth of MI demand above what it would otherwise have been. The implication is that the velocity of actual MI has grown more slowly than would have been the case if OCDs had never been introduced. Owing to the year-end 1980 introduction of nationwide NOWs, this effect was 4. In standard MI demand functions the partial elasticity with respect to interest rates is negative and-consistent with an inventory theory of money demand-the elasticity with respect to real income is positive but less than unity. Thus increases in both raise MI velocity, other things being equal. particularly pronounced last year, when the velocity of actual M1 increased 2/4 percentage points more slowly than the velocity of an MI measure that attempts to abstract from the effects of NOWs, shown in column 3. The latter "shift-adjusted" measure removes from MI an estimate of the funds switched to NOW accounts from non-MI sources in 1981, on the grounds that such inflows distorted the demand for MI relative to its historical determinants.5 It is estimated that $12/4 billion shifted from non-MI sources to OCDs during that year.6
This adjusted concept in earlier years is shown in column 3 by the velocity growth of an unofficial estimate of shift-adjusted MI, which is constructed by subtracting from M I an estimate of the fraction of inflows to OCDs from non-M I sources in those years. The growth of this adjusted M1 velocity was 13/4 percentage points faster, on average, in the third subperiod than in the second. By 1981 the velocity growth of this shiftadjusted measure exceeded its trend in the second subperiod by almost 43/4 percentage points. In that year the velocity of actual MI, shown in column 1, grew a bit faster than its historical trend, despite shifts of savings balances into OCDs. These shifts, which reduced velocity, were more than offset by the effect of other unusual factors at work in the opposite direction.
A conventional interest rate response is not one of these other factors increasing velocity. Indeed, in two of the three years in which MI velocity growth accelerated to above 4 percent, 1975 and 1981, the decline in the Treasury bill rate represented a marked deceleration in its annual rate of change.
What, then, were the other factors? The sources of more rapid velocity growth than expected around the mid-1970s have been examined else-5. The distortion arose from the higher marginal own rates on transactions balances available on nationwide NOWs and the relatively high minimum balance requirements for these newly offered accounts. The Federal Reserve set a 1981 growth range of 3/2 to 6 percent for this shift-adjusted measure-down from the 4 to 61/2 percent range for actual M1B in 1980. When Ml is held exogenous at Ml, the reduced-form expressions for Y and M2 can be decomposed into a predicted value, which is indicated by superscript p, and an error term as follows: Examination of the error terms in equations 5 and 6 indicates that various disturbances tend to introduce a positive correlation between income and M2 when Ml is fixed. A positive shock to the spending function (el > 0) with Ml fixed raises Y, though its effect on M2 is theoretically ambiguous. The higher income tends to raise the quantity demanded of NT, the nontransactions component of M2, but the associated increase in the interest rate works in the opposite direction. However, the marked increase since mid-1978 in the proportion of this component bearing market-related yields has substantially lowered its responsiveness to movements in market interest rates (that is, j is approaching zero). Accordingly, it seems clear that the income effect substantially outweighs the interest rate effect and that nominal income and M2 will be positively correlated in response to a shift in spending behavior.
A downward shift in Ml demand (e2 < 0) not accommodated by a reduced Ml target will lower the interest rate and raise income. At the same time, both effects serve to increase the quantity demanded of NT (though the interest rate effect is likely small, as noted above). This analysis has relevance for the experience in 1981 when, as discussed below, an apparent downward drift in the shift-adjusted Ml demand function of historical proportions had little impact on M2 velocity.
Sympathetic movements of Yand M2 in response to these disturbances cushion the variability of M2 velocity compared to the situation with an exogenously determined M2. In the latter case, as may be seen in equation 7, the income numerator in the M2 velocity expression is affected by all three of the equations' errors, but the M2 denominator is, by assumption, unchanged.
The outcome of this analysis is simply that the error properties of M2 velocity predictions depend upon whether M2 is endogenous or held exogenous. Should the Federal Reserve switch to more single-minded control over M2, there is the danger that what appears in recent years to be rather stable and predictable behavior of M2 velocity would tend to break down. I Such a concern is becoming increasingly academic, however, because incentive to adopt improved techniques of cash management. 13 Its ability to predict average MI demand over this period suggests the levels of short-and intermediate-term interest rates on average since 1979 have been consistent with the average levels of real income and prices given the quantity of shift-adjusted MI supplied. To show this result more formally, table 3 displays dynamic simulation predictions of the PorterSimpson equation solved for the three-month Treasury bill rate, using a supplementary term-structure equation to explain the five-year note rate given current and lagged predicted three-month bill rates and current and lagged inflation rates.14 Averaged over these periods, the predicted three-month Treasury bill rate is close to the actual rate.
The table also A plausible partial explanation for the related behavior of OCDs and savings deposits over this four-month period is that the public had temporarily increased its preference for highly liquid assets in response to heightened uncertainties regarding both the economic outlook-as suggested by the higher unemployment rate-and the outlook for interest rates. Some support for this interpretation is provided in the second row of table 4, which shows a remarkably similar pattern for another fourmonth period ending in September 1980.17 Taken together, these episodes suggest that the increased importance of OCDs, now representing nearly one-fifth of MI, has made savings-oriented motives a more important influence on MI demand than they have been in the past. Thus MI demand in the future could respond differently to movements in economic variables than it has historically. Table 5 shows the quarterly behavior of M2 demand relative to predictions from a portfolio equation in which interest rates and wealth determine M2. The quarterly movements in this aggregate were not much more predictable than were those of MI during this period. Such behavior of short-term rates is predicted by a theory of moneystock determination when the money-demand schedule (on interest ratemoney space) is subject to greater variation than the money-supply schedule, and when money-supply and money-demand functions have, respectively, positive and negative short-term interest rate elasticities. In this situation, the Federal Reserve's procedures partially accommodate short-run divergences in money demand from target. At the same time, as changed short-rates alter the quantity of money demanded, forces automatically start to bring money partially back to target. Over the longer run of three to six months, the Federal Reserve also tends to adjust the path for nonborrowed reserves and the discount rate, as may be needed, to bring the monetary aggregates fully back to path. This description of the process through which the money supply is controlled, combined with the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates and the efficient markets hypothesis, explains why publication of an unexpectedly strong MI figure after the close of the business day on Friday raises interest rates across the maturity spectrum in after-hours trading. Market participants know, perhaps only intuitively, that surprise in money demand in a given week calls for some revision in the same direction in their expectations of the money-demand schedule in future weeks also. Over the near term, if money demand is surprisingly high, the expected level of the federal funds rate will be higher than previously thought because of the enlarged levels of discount borrowing implied by a fixed nonborrowed reserves operating target and higher expected required reserves. Expectations of short-term interest rates over a longer period also will be raised if participants believe the Federal Reserve will, in three to six months, provide only an amount of reserves able to support a stock of money consistent with the long-run money objective. Future short-term rates higher than previously expected would be needed to bring the quantity of money demanded in line, given the higher forecasts of future money-demand schedules. Accordingly, interest rates with maturities of six months to a year can also be expected to rise in line with the higher expectations for future shorter-term spot rates.
The response of Treasury bill rates with these maturities to Friday publication of the money stock has been substantially greater since October 1979 than before.'8 This behavior suggests that the Federal Reserve's determination to control annual money growth became more credible to market participants after the institution of the new procedures. My impression, however, is that long-term interest rates typically have adjusted by more than is consistent with this mechanism alone in the context of an expectations hypothesis of the term structure. In general, not only Treasury bill rates but also bond yields have exhibited considerable variation over the last two and one-half years, and standard economic theories do not seem to provide a convincing explanation. For these long-term rates, it appears that a puzzle still remains. that, first, such short-run deviations in money from path do not significantly disturb the economy; and second, a steeper short-run supply function coupled with greater determination to keep it coincident with the long-run money path at all times would add significantly to volatility in credit markets.
The Optimal Precision of Short-Run Monetary Control
In light of these considerations, a target for nonborrowed reserves is preferable to a total-reserve operating target, and a nonvertical discount rate graduation is preferable to a floating penalty discount rate. Furthermore, when a gap between the money stock and the midpoint of the longer-run range opens up in a given month, the Federal Reserve should not aim at closing it in less than three months or so on average. And as noted above, policymakers should keep the option of adjusting the longrun monetary target in response to reasonably conclusive indications of permanent shifts in the money-demand function.
Some economists have argued for a much tighter short-run control of the money supply by offering an alternative interpretation of recent interest rate movements. In their interpretation, short-term interest rates respond positively to that portion of money-stock variations perceived as permanent by market participants.24 Economic agents see such permanent monetary impulses as having future consequences for spending, credit demands, rate of change of prices, and hence interest rates. Thus a policy that would lessen variation in money and total reservesand in turn lower market participants' perceptions of variations in the permanent component of money and reserve shocks-would reduce, not increase, the volatility of short-term interest rates.
However, there seem to be several problems with this analysis. Given the lags in the transmission mechanism linking changes in money and total reserves to economic activity and prices, it is difficult to believe that changes in perceptions of the permanent component of money and reserves should affect interest rates on assets with maturities as short as three to six months. Furthermore, it is hard to see why a sizable part of weekly changes in money should be expected to be permanent, let alone why they should be expected to modify the longer-run growth rate of money. Finally, the changes in the Federal Reserve's policy that led to a stronger commitment to meet longer-term targets for money growth should have reduced the perceived permanence of short-term variations in money; yet interest rate volatility increased after the new policy was adopted.
The arguments for tight short-run control of the money stock are not supported by an empirical model that can explain short-term interest rate and money-stock movements as well as the conventional moneysupply, money-demand framework.25 Unless a convincing alternative to the money supply-money demand framework is developed and tested, policymakers should be wary of controlling the stock of money over monthly and even quarterly periods with the precision that is technically feasible.
Determining the appropriate degree of short-run accommodation to money-demand shifts remains difficult. The answer depends on the dynamic response of the financial sector and economic activity to changes in the reserves instrument and to shocks to money-supply and money-demand functions, as well as on the nature and persistence of those shocks. A number of discussants suggested that the old regime of interest rate targeting looks better now that we have had experience with moneysupply targeting. Lawrence Klein argued that the interest rate and the growth rate of MIB have fluctuated much more widely since the introduction of money-supply targeting in October 1979. He inferred that the new rule has introduced far more instability into the system than was present under the old operating procedures. Christopher Sims addressed the issue of whether the Federal Reserve should further tighten its monetary control mechanisms and resist more forcefully short-run deviations from the target. He noted that myopic attempts to eliminate all deviation in monetary aggregates from targets in the short run could, ironically, result in greater instability in both the instrument and the target. According to his own econometric investigations, it appears that the relation between money stock and interest rates is consistent with the instability described by Klein. Lindsey cautioned that the absolute errors of standard money-demand functions had risen substantially in the past two years, suggesting that the greater instability of both interest rates and the money stock could be independent of the change in operating procedures. Ralph Bryant noted that the focus of policy on intermediate monetary targets, regardless of the particular aggregates selected, could easily have undesired consequences. He argued that the current specification of ranges for the monetary targets gave the Federal Reserve more flexibility than its own rhetoric might suggest. But Bryant concluded that the monetary authorities are nonetheless more rigid in their commitment to the monetary targets than they ought to be in view of the instability of velocity and of the "multiplier" linking money to bank reserves.
Alan Blinder reasoned that a decade ago our knowledge about the relations between the relevant variables was too sketchy to permit a choice between interest rate targeting and targeting the money supply. However, the progressive deregulation of the financial system that will occur over the next few years now clearly makes interest rate targeting preferable to the monetarist prescription. Gordon added that in a world of uncertain money demand, interest rate targeting is probably the best way to implement a nominal GNP target over the next couple of years.
John Kareken took issue with the proponents of interest rate targeting. He suggested that the mentality of the Federal Open Market Committee was the principal reason for preferring money-supply targets to interest rate targets because the committee would never permit interest rates to move as much as appropriate countercyclical policy required. Franco Modigliani argued for targeting monetary aggregates, interest rates, and GNP. When realizations of these variables are not consistent with targets or are not consistent with one another, policymakers should attempt to decide why and then alter the targets appropriately.
Two hypotheses were offered to explain the market reaction to the "surprises" in Friday announcements of money-supply growth. Wojnilower rejected the notion that large fluctuations in interest rates following these announcements could be attributable to any kind of sober expectations process concerning the longer-term impact of money surprises. He offered instead the view that bond traders and participants in futures markets are engaged in a speculative game with short timehorizons in which key macroeconomic variables play no real role. Jeffrey Sachs agreed with Lindsey's interpretation of money surprises and offered some supporting evidence from the foreign exchange market. Under the hypothesis that surprisingly high money growth is associated with higher expected rates of future inflation, unexpected fast money growth would be associated with depreciation of the dollar. By contrast, under the hypothesis that such surprises are indicative of shifts in money demand, as Lindsey suggests, they would be associated with a strengthening of the dollar. He reported that results of Jeffrey Frankel's research support the second hypothesis.
William Poole disagreed with two technical points raised by Lindsey's paper. First, he took issue with Lindsey's conclusion that the shift into MI due to introduction of NOW accounts is over. Pointing to the New England experience, he argued that this shift is likely to take much longer to complete. Lindsey responded that the promotional activities of depository institutions were relatively prompt and intense this time, so the national shift ought to run its course faster. Poole also disagreed that Federal Reserve policies are best characterized as nonborrowed reserves control. He argued that Federal Reserve policy is better characterized as free reserves control. If the Lindsey characterization were correct, the monetary authorities would not have to take a position on how quickly to bring money growth back to the target path but would, instead, allow the market to make that decision through bank decisions at the discount window or through their decisions on holding borrowed or excess reserves.
